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How Administrative Law Halted the Death Penalty in
Maryland
By Arnold Rochvarg*
Over the years, various arguments have been made to challenge
death sentences given to convicted criminal defendants.' These
arguments have primarily been based on constitutional claims
involving ineffective assistance of counsel,2 equal protection,3 right
to trial by jury,4 and cruel and unusual punishment.5 Constitutional
Criminal Law arguments were again raised in the recent Maryland
case, Evans v. Maryland,6 which sought to overturn the death
sentence of a hired killer who had been convicted of two counts of
first degree murder.7 None of these arguments were successful. An
Administrative Law argument, however, was successful not only in
stopping the execution of Evans, but also in halting the death penalty
in Maryland.8
The Administrative Law argument that was successful in Evans
was based on the statutory procedures which must be followed in
order for an administrative agency to adopt a valid, legally binding
* Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. Author of MARYLAND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (MICPEL 2d ed. 2007).
1. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304 (2002); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Oken v. Maryland, 378 Md. 179, 835 A.2d 1105
(2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1017 (2004).
2. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
3. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
4. See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
5. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
6. 396 Md. 256, 914 A.2d 25 (2006).
7. Id. at 269-70, 914 A.2d at 33.
8. Evans, 396 Md. 256, 914 A.2d 25.
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regulation.9 This argument is of recent vintage in Administrative Law
litigation, and it appears to have had its first application to the death
penalty in Evans. This Administrative Law argument has the
potential for wide application, and is another reminder why it is so
important for all lawyers, regardless of what area of law they
practice, to understand the principles of Administrative Law.
In 1983, Vernon Evans ("Evans") was paid $ 9,000 to kill a
husband and wife who were both potential witnesses in an upcoming
federal criminal case.' Evans killed the husband and another woman
whom Evans mistakenly believed was the woman he had been hired
to kill." In 1984, Evans was convicted of two counts of first-degree
murder and sentenced to death.'2 The convictions and sentence were
originally affirmed on appeal, 13 but in 1991, a post-conviction
proceeding resulted in a new sentencing hearing. 14 After this new
sentencing hearing, a second jury also sentenced Evans to death.'5
The recent opinion by the Court of Appeals of Maryland concerned
this second death sentence.
Capital punishment was accomplished in Maryland, until 1955,
by hanging. 16 In 1955, legislation was enacted which ended death by
hanging and replaced it with death by lethal gas.'7 The gas chamber
was regarded by the legislature at that time to be "less painful and
more dignified than hanging or electrocution."' 18 By 1993, Maryland
was the only state that used lethal gas for capital punishment.' 9 A
9. See generally Arnold Rochvarg, MARYLAND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, § 5.1
(MICPEL 2d ed. 2007).
10. Evans, 396 Md. at 269, 914 A.2d at 33.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 269-70, 914 A.2d at 33.
13. Id. at 270, 914 A.2d at 33 (respectively referring to Evans v. State, 382
Md. 248, 855 A.2d 291 (2004); Evans v. State, 304 Md. 487, 499 A.2d 1261
(1985)).
14. Id. at 270, 914 A.2d at 33.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 342, 914 A.2d at 76 (discussing the Report of the Governor's
Commission on the Death Penalty).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. (citing the Report of the Governor's Commission on the Death Penalty
at 215).
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"Governor's Commission on the Death Penalty" in 1993
recommended that lethal injection be substituted for the gas chamber
as the sole method of execution in Maryland.2 ° In 1994, legislation
was enacted and codified in Title 3, section 3-905(a) of the
Correctional Services Act.21 This section provides: "the manner of
inflicting the punishment of death shall be the continuous intravenous
administration of a lethal quantity of an ultrashort-acting barbiturate
or other similar drug in combination with a chemical paralytic agent
until a licensed physician pronounces death according to accepted
standards of medical practice." 22 In response to this legislation, the
Department of Corrections (DOC) adopted an "Execution Operations
Manual"
("EOM") which sets forth the details of how the execution should
be implemented.23  The EOM includes topics such as the
responsibilities of DOC personnel, pre-execution procedures, security
for inmates awaiting executions, and a "Lethal Injection Checklist"
which sets forth the contents of the lethal injection and the method of
injecting it.24
I. ARGUMENTS RAISED IN EVANS
In an earlier death penalty case, Oken v. Maryland,25 the Court of
Appeals of Maryland held that Maryland's method of execution by
lethal injection did not constitute cruel or unusual punishment.26 This
issue was not central to Evans' appeal.27 Rather, Evans made the
following five arguments to overturn his death sentence: 28
20. Id.
21. Md. Code Ann. Corr. Servs. § 3-905(a) (1999).
22. Id.
23. Evans, 396 Md. at 337, 914 A.2d at 73.
24. For discussion of some of the details of execution, see id. at 338, 914 A.2d
at 73.
25. 378 Md. 179, 835 A.2d 1105 (2003).
26. Id. at 269, 835 A.2d at 1157.
27. Evans, 396 Md. at 328 n.13, 914 A.2d at 67 n.13 ("We shall ... regard any
cruel and unusual punishment claim as having been knowingly and voluntarily
waived with respect to the appeal.").
28. Id. at 269-71, 914 A.2d at 33-34.
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(1) A new sentencing hearing was required because Evans'
attorneys at the second sentencing hearing failed to investigate and
present mitigating evidence relating to his background. This
constituted prejudicial, ineffective assistance of counsel under
Wiggins v. Smith29 and Rompilla v. Beard.3 °
(2) Under the holding of Miller-El v. Dretke,31 a new trial on
Evans' guilt was required because the prosecution in the selection of
the jury at the 1984 trial had exercised its peremptory strikes in a
racially discriminatory manner.
(3) The death sentence imposed on Evans was unconstitutional
because of selective prosecution by the Baltimore County State's
Attorney's Office based on racial and geographic discrimination.
(4) The EOM, which sets forth the details of the implementation
of the death penalty by lethal injection, conflicted with the statute
which adopted lethal injection as Maryland's method of capital
punishment.
(5) The EOM was invalid and thus could not be the basis of any
execution by lethal injection because the EOM was a "regulation"
within the definition of the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). The EOM had not been adopted in compliance with the APA
procedural requirements for the adoption of a regulation.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland rejected Evans' first four
arguments, but granted relief on the fifth argument.32 The Court
agreed that the EOM was a regulation that had never been properly
adopted under the APA.3 3 This holding required an injunction against
the carrying out of any death sentence by lethal injection in
Maryland, including the death sentence imposed on Evans.34
The vast majority of the Court's opinion is concerned with the
arguments involving ineffective assistance of counsel and racial
discrimination.35 These arguments, which have been raised in other
death penalty cases, were rejected by the majority of the Court after a
detailed, careful analysis. These Constitutional Criminal Law
29. 539 U.S. 510, 534-35 (2003).
30. 545 U.S. 374, 388-93 (2005).
31. See 545 U.S. 231 (2005).
32. Evans, 396 Md. at 271, 914 A.2d at 34.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 256, 914 A.2d at 80-81.
35. See generally id.
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arguments have been extensively discussed by numerous
commentators, 36 and this article is not concerned with them. The
winning argument for Evans (and all death penalty opponents) - the
Administrative Law procedure argument - had not been raised in any
death penalty appeal prior to Evans. The Court's analysis of this issue
is relatively short, straightforward and simple. As discussed in this
article, the Court of Appeals of Maryland was clearly correct in its
conclusion on this issue.
II. APA RULEMAKING REQUIREMENTS
The APA defines the term "regulation" as a statement that has
general application, future effect and is adopted by an agency to
detail or carry out a law that the agency administers or which governs
the agency's organization, procedure or practice. 37 The label placed
on the statement by the agency does not control whether the
statement is a regulation. Something is a regulation even if the
agency calls it a guideline, a standard, a statement of policy, a
directive, an interpretation or anything else if it satisfies the
definition of regulation set forth in the APA.38 The only statement
that meets the definition of regulation, but is not treated as a
regulation under the Maryland APA, is a statement that "concerns
only the internal management" of the agency and "does not affect
directly the rights of the public or the procedures available to the
public."39
The major significance to whether something is a regulation is
that in order for an agency to base its action on a regulation, the
regulation must have been adopted by the agency pursuant to the
procedural requirements for adoption of regulations as set forth in the
APA. These procedures include prior review and approval by the
36. A Westlaw search of law review articles on "death penalty," "capital
punishment," and "constitutional attack," indicates that there have been over 20,000
articles discussing the issue. http://www.westlaw.com (last visited Mar. 18, 2007).
37. Md. Code Ann., State Gov't § 10-101(g)(1) (2004 & Supp. 2006)
[hereinafter State Gov't § -].
38. See Massey v. Sec'y, Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 389 Md. 496,
527, 886 A.2d 585, 603 (2005) (Bell, J., concurring and dissenting).
39. State Gov't § 10-101(g)(2)(i).
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Attorney General, 4° review and approval by a joint committee of the
House of Delegates and the Senate known as the Joint Committee on
Administrative, Executive, and Legislative Review ("AELR
Committee"), 41 and publication of a notice of proposed adoption of
the regulation in the Maryland Register. 42 This published notice must
include "the estimated economic impact of the proposed regulation
on the revenues and expenditures" of agencies of the state and local
governments, and upon consumers, businesses, industries, taxpayers,
and trade groups. 43 The published notice of proposed adoption of a
regulation must also set forth the "date, time, and place for a public
hearing at which oral or written views and information" can be
submitted to the agency either in support of or in opposition to the
proposed regulation.' If the agency wants to adopt a proposed
regulation that has been opposed by the AELR Committee, the
proposed regulation is submitted to the Governor who has the
ultimate power to order the agency to withdraw it, modify it or adopt
it.45 If adopted, a notice of adoption is published in the Maryland
Register.46 A regulation, as defined by the APA, cannot be relied
upon by an agency if the above described procedures have not been
followed, unless the agency can establish that what is being
challenged concerns only the internal management of the agency and
does not affect directly the rights of the public.47
III. MARYLAND CASES DISCUSSING WHETHER
"SOMETHING" Is A REGULATION
The significance of the Maryland APA's definition of regulation
seems to have been only recently recognized by Maryland courts.
The first Court of Appeals of Maryland decision addressing the
argument that an agency statement was a regulation, and was invalid
40. State Gov't § 10-107(b).
41. State Gov't § 10-101(c).
42. State Gov't § 10-112(a)(2).
43. State Gov't § 10-1 12(a)(3)(i).
44. State Gov't § 10-112(a)(3)(v).
45. State Gov't § 10-111.1(c).
46. State Gov't § 10-114(a) (Supp. 2006).
47. State Gov't § 10-101(g)(2)(i).
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because it had not been adopted pursuant to the required APA
procedures, was not until 1996. That opinion did not rely on the APA
definition of regulation in reaching its conclusion. The case,
Department of Health & Mental Hygiene v. Chimes,48 upheld the
agency's decision to impose a cap on the growth of the amount
payable to reimburse providers of services to persons with
developmental disabilities. 49 This growth cap had been adopted by
the agency without following the APA procedures for a regulation.50
In response to the procedural challenge to the growth cap, the Court
of Appeals of Maryland upheld the growth cap.51 The Court relied
upon the following grounds for its holding:
1. the growth cap did not have widespread application;
2. the growth cap did not change existing law;
3. the growth cap did not apply retroactively;
4. the agency had a strong interest in adopting a cost containment
policy as quickly as possible.52
In 2001, the First Edition of my book Maryland Administrative
Law 53 was published. In that edition, I criticized the Chimes opinion,
and called it "not useful" because its holding was not based on the
Maryland APA's definition of regulation.5 4 I wrote at that time that
the issue in Chimes should have been decided "solely on the
definition of regulation as it appears in the APA." 55
In 2002, the Court of Appeals of Maryland decided Delmarva
Power & Light Co. v. Public Service Commission. 56 The Public
Service Commission (PSC) had adopted "standards" that governed
issues arising from the diversification and expansion of business
activities by regulated utilities into areas of non-regulated business
48. 343 Md. 336, 681 A.2d 484 (1996).
49. Id. at 347-48, 681 A.2d at 489.
50. Id. at 342-43, 681 A.2d at 487.
51. Id. at 347-48, 681 A.2d at 489.
52. Id. at 346-47, 681 A.2d at 489.
53. Arnold Rochvarg, MARYLAND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (MICPEL 1st ed.
2001).
54. Id. § 2.2, at 8-10.
55. Id. § 2.2, at 10.
56. 370 Md. 1, 803 A.2d 460 (2002).
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activities. 57 For example, the standards prohibited joint advertising,
joint sales calls and joint office locations between a utility and a non-
regulated affiliate.58 These standards had the most immediate
application to the utility Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. and its
affiliate, BGE Home, but the standards applied to all utilities.5 9
Several utilities challenged these standards because they believed
these standards were regulations that had been adopted without
following the APA procedures for the adoption of regulations. 60 The
Court of Appeals of Maryland in Delmarva unanimously ruled, based
on the APA definition of regulation, that the PSC standards were
regulations and therefore invalid.6' The opinion stated that the PSC
standards had general application to all utilities and their affiliates,
they had future effect and they carried out the laws that the PSC
administers. 62 This 2002 opinion in Delmarva is the first case where
the APA definition of regulation had been relied upon to invalidate
an agency's action.
IV. IMPACT OF DELMARVA
After Delmarva was decided, I spoke at several continuing legal
education programs for lawyers and judges. I expressed my opinion
that Delmarva was a very important decision that could have great
impact. Lawyers had told me of "regulations" lurking within agencies
masquerading as guidelines, policies, directives, bulletins, memos,
standards, guidances, etc. None had been adopted according to the
APA requirements for a regulation. My opinion was that they were
all invalid.
In 2004, I agreed to serve as pro bono counsel on behalf of
mentally retarded residents of the Rosewood Center, a State
residential center in Owings Mills operated by the Developmental
Disabilities Administration (DDA), an agency within the Department
of Health and Mental Hygiene (DHMH). A plan had been devised by
57. Id. at 10-17, 803 A.2d at 465-69.
58. Id. at 18-19, 803 A.2d at 470.
59. Id. at 21-22, 803 A.2d at 472.
60. Id. at 17, 803 A.2d at 469.
61. Id. at 4, 803 A.2d at 462.
62. Id. at 26, 803 A.2d at 474.
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the DDA to transfer some Rosewood Center residents to the Clifton
T. Perkins Hospital Center, a state psychiatric hospital. The decision
as to which Rosewood Center residents would be transferred was
based in part on "Rosewood Center Policy Number 152" which
created a Forensic Review Board to make decisions regarding
Rosewood residents. Policy Number 152 had been adopted by the
DDA without following the APA rulemaking procedures. After the
DDA ignored several attempts to resolve this matter without
resorting to the judicial process, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment
was filed seeking an order from the Circuit Court of Howard County
that Policy Number 152 was an invalid regulation, and that any
decisions or actions made pursuant to it were invalid. Shortly after
the filing of this lawsuit, the DDA abolished the Forensic Review
Board and agieed in a Memorandum of Understanding that it would
"not reconstitute any entity absent the adoption of regulations under
the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act."
63
In 2005, the Court of Appeals of Maryland decided Massey v.
Secretary, Department of Public Safety & Correctional Services
64
(DPSCS) in which the court held invalid "Directives" of the
DPSCS. 65 These Directives created and defined administrative
offenses for which inmates were subject to administrative
discipline.66 The Directives also set forth the types of discipline
available upon a finding of guilt, and set forth procedures for
charging inmates with offenses and for imposing discipline. 67 These
Directives were adopted by the DPSCS without compliance with the
APA requirements for a regulation.6 s The Secretary of the DPSCS
took the position that the Directives were not regulations. The Court
of Appeals of Maryland held that the Directives were "clearly"
regulations.69 The Court wrote:
63. Seelenbinder v. Sabatini, No. 13-C-04-58287 (Howard County Cir. Ct.,
2004) (on file with author).
64. 389 Md. 496, 886 A.2d 585 (2005).
65. Id. at 498-99, 886 A.2d at 587.
66. Id. at 498, 886 A.2d at 586.
67. Id. at 498, 886 A.2d at 586-87.
68. Massey v. Sec'y, Dep't of Pub. Safety and Corr. Servs., 389 Md. 496, 498-
99, 886 A.2d 585, 587 (2005).
69. Id. at 507-08, 886 A.2d at 592.
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[The Directives] constitute statements that have
general application throughout all of the correctional
institutions in DOC [Department of Corrections] and
apply to all inmates in those institutions; they have
future effect; they were adopted by [an agency] to
carry out laws that the [agency] administers; and they
are in the form of rules, standards, statements of
interpretation, and statements of policy.
70
The Court of Appeals of Maryland also unanimously rejected the
agency's argument that the Directives concerned only the internal
management of the agency and did not affect directly the rights of the
public or the procedures available to the public.7' In so ruling, the
Court held that if a regulation affects fundamental rights, it cannot be
characterized as pertaining only to internal management,7 2 and that
the internal management exception to the APA rulemaking
procedures does not apply if the agency statement substantially
affects rights of the public.73 In Massey, the Court agreed that prison
inmates are "part of the public."74 The Directives were held invalid.75
The Massey case also tried to send a message to the State that it
should start to pay attention to this rulemaking procedure issue. It
noted that although only a few Directives were at issue in this case,
there were "seven substantial volumes of them. '76 The court added:
"We do caution the Secretary and the Commissioner to review very
carefully all of the directives that they have issued ... and determine,
at least from their perspective, whether, in light of this Opinion, they
need to be adopted in the form of regulations. 77
70. Id.
71. Id. at 524, 886 A.2d at 602.
72. Id. at 518, 886 A.2d at 598.
73. Massey, 398 Md. at 520, 886 A.2d at 599.
74. Id. at 522, 886 A.2d at 600 (citing Martin v. Dep't of Corrs., 424 Mich.
553, 384 N.W.2d 392 (1986)).
75. Id. at 499, 886 A.2d at 587.
76. Id. at 501, 886 A.2d at 588.
77. Id. at 508 n.3, 886 A.2d at 592 n.3.
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V. EVANS' APPEAL
A few weeks after the Massey opinion, Evans filed with the
prison warden a request for administrative relief based on the
argument that the lethal injection execution protocol set forth in the
EOM constituted regulations that were invalid because they had been
adopted without following the Maryland APA procedures for a
regulation.78 The warden denied this request for relief, and Evans
appealed the warden's decision to the DOC.79 When the DOC also
denied any relief,8° Evans appealed this decision to the Inmate
Grievance Office (IGO).81 The IGO delegated its authority to hear
the case, and to make a proposed decision, to the Maryland Office of
Administrative Hearings (OAH), a central hearing agency.82 The
administrative law judge ("AL") ruled that the execution protocols
in the EOM were indeed regulations under the APA, and because
they had been adopted without complying with the APA procedures
for adopting regulations, the EOM was invalid and could not be used
to execute Evans. 83 This proposed decision by the OAH AU was
then sent to the Secretary of the DPSCS, who had authority to make
the final administrative decision. 84 The Secretary's decision was that
the EOM "is not a regulation requiring adoption pursuant to the APA
rule-making provisions." '85 This issue was eventually decided by the
Court of Appeals of Maryland which ruled that the EOM was a
regulation.8 6
The Court of Appeals of Maryland first set forth the APA's
procedural requirements for the adoption of a regulation.87 It then
noted that none of the procedures had been followed by the DOC in
adopting the EOM. 88 The Court then set forth the APA definition of
78. Evans, 396 Md. at 348, 914 A.2d at 70.
79. Id. at 332, 914 A.2d at 70.
80. Id. at 333, 914 A.2d at 70.
81. Id. at 332-33, 914 A.2d at 70.
82. Id.
83. Evans, 396 Md. at 333, 914 A.2d at 70.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 349-50, 914 A.2d at 78.
87. Id. at 348, 914 A.2d at 79.
88. Evans, 396 Md. at 345, 914 A.2d at 78.
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regulation, and addressed the reasons why the Secretary of DPSCS
had ruled that the EOM was not a regulation.8 9 First, in response to
the Secretary's conclusion that the EOM did not have general
application, the Court wrote that: "there can be no legitimate doubt
that the portions of the EOM that govern the method of and
procedure for administering the lethal injection have general
application and future effect, were adopted to detail or carry out a
law that DOC administers, and govern the procedure of DOC."9' In
response to the Secretary's position that the EOM concerned only the
internal management of DOC and did not directly affect the rights of
the public, the Court responded that the EOM affected "not only the
inmates and the correctional personnel, but the witnesses allowed to
observe the execution and the public generally, through its perception
of the process." 91 Because the EOM had not been adopted pursuant to
the APA procedures, the lethal injection protocols were "ineffective
and may not be used until such time as they are properly adopted. 9 2
The death penalty in Maryland was halted "until such time as the
contents of [the lethal injection] checklist ... are adopted as
regulations in accordance with the requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act or the General Assembly exempts the
checklist from the requirements of that Act."93
VI. POTENTIAL IMPACT OF EVANS
From an Administrative Law perspective, Evans is not a
significant case. Evans is a straightforward application of Delmarva
and Massey. Evans does not make new Administrative Law. Anyone
who read Delmarva and Massey would have predicted the holding in
Evans.
From a death penalty perspective, Evans is a monumental case.
All executions in Maryland have been halted by its holding. Evans
has reopened the debate over the death penalty in Maryland. Unless
legislation is enacted which exempts the death penalty protocols from
89. Id.
90. Id. at 346, 914 A.2d at 78.
91. Id. at 349, 914 A.2d at 80.
92. Id. at 350, 914 A.2d at 80.
93. Evans, 396 Md. at 350, 914 A.2d at 81.
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the APA rulemaking requirements,94 there will be no death penalty in
Maryland until a consensus can be reached in favor of the death
penalty and on the method and details of execution.
Because of its tremendous significance as a death penalty case,
Evans may also become a significant case in Maryland
Administrative Law. This may be true not because of its analysis of
the APA definition of regulation and the procedures that need to be
followed for any agency action that satisfies that definition - this
article has already discussed that Evans is a simple application of
past case law - but because of its potential impact on Maryland
agencies. It does not appear that prior decisions from the courts - all
of which were against the State - motivated State agencies to review
their directives, guidelines, bulletins, policies, or whatever the agency
called them to determine whether the agency was in compliance with
the APA. Nor have past defeats in the courts seemed to have stopped
State agencies from continuing to adopt more of these regulations
without complying with the APA. Perhaps, hopefully, Evans will
lead to a change in attitude of State agencies in their awareness of
and obligation to the procedural requirements of the Maryland APA.
The public is now aware of this issue. Moreover, State agencies
should now understand that the Court of Appeals of Maryland has
demonstrated that it is willing to enforce the APA requirements in a
meaningful manner.
The full extent of the invalid regulation problem in Maryland is
not clear. Only the State agencies themselves know how many
regulations exist within their agencies that have not been properly
adopted. It is much more preferable if this issue is resolved through
agency review of its own files rather than individual lawsuits in the
courts.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Administrative Law issue raised in Evans v. Maryland was
not unique. What is unique about the opinion in Evans was the issue's
94. I strongly oppose such legislation. See Arnold Rochvarg, Senate Should
Not Exempt Death Penalty Regulations from the APA, THE DAILY RECORD
(Maryland), Mar. 2, 2007. During the 2007 legislative session, both the House of
Delgates and the Senate rejected bills that would have amended the APA to exempt
death penalty regulations from the APA's rulemaking requirements.
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application to a public policy issue which attracts tremendous public
attention. For this reason, Evans may become not only a leading
death penalty case but also a leading Administrative Law case.
